Hidden Markov models (HMMs) have been successful for modelling the dynamics of carefully dictated speech, but their performance degrades severely when used to model conversational speech. Since speech is produced by a system of loosely coupled articulators, stochastic models explicitly representing this parallelism may have advantages for automatic speech recognition (ASR), particularly when trying to model the phonological effects inherent in casual spontaneous speech. This paper presents a preliminary feasibility study of one such model class: loosely coupled HMMs. Exact model (...) estimation and decoding is potentially expensive, so possible approximate algorithms are also discussed. Comparison of one particular loosely coupled model on an isolated word task suggests loosely coupled HMMs merit further investigation. An approximate algorithm giving performance which is almost always statistically indistinguishable from the exact algorithm is also identified, making more extensive research computationally feasible. (shrink)

summaryThis paper discusses objections against the idea that the meaning of a word is its use. Sct. 1 accepts Rundle's point that ‘meaning’ and ‘use’ are used differently, but insists that this is compatible with holding that use determines meaning, an therefore holds the key to conceptual analysis. Scts. 2–4 rebut three lines of argument which claim that linguistic philosophy goes astray by reading into the meaning of words non‐semantic features of its use: Searle's general speech act fallacy charge, Hacker's (...) use of the Frege‐point against Wittgenstein's account of avowals, and Grice's attack on Wittgenstein's discussion of ‘trying’. Sct. 5 argues that Grice's doctrine of conversational implicature fails to show that the features he disregards are pragmatic rather than semantic. Sct. 6 ends with some suggestions about how use can be related to meaning without being abused. (shrink)

This paper offers a new approach to the philosophical foundations of information systems through feminist philosophy and, in particular, feminist epistemology. This can be used to expose the universalizing tendency of many information systems and to show the importance of using real-life complex examples rather than the simplified examples often favored by philosophers. Within traditional epistemology and its relation to IS, subjectivity, the propositional/skills distinction and epistemic hierarchies are subject to arguments from feminist epistemology. With respect to the emerging critical (...) school of IS, feminist epistemology, and within that, feminist standpoint theory, are used to examine the complexities of the positivist/anti-positivist position and the related concept of emancipation. In addition, it is argued that the liberal version of emancipation encapsulated in such systems may have an effect opposite to that of emancipation These issues are illustrated in an existing expert systems project. (shrink)

The question of whether the Einstein shift in clock rates has a bearing on the validity of the fourth Heisenberg uncertainty relation is discussed. It is shown that, even if one would accept all the relevant assumptions and conclusions of Bohr and Rosenfeld, this uncertainty relation could not be saved by an Einstein shift in the case of an electrostatic weighing. This means that the Einstein shift does not play any role in determining the validity of the fourth Heisenberg relation.

In 1922, many representatives of the Russian Intelligentsia, including many philosophers, were exiled from the young soviet state. Many left with the so-called Philosophy Steamer (Chamberlain in The philosophy steamer: Lenin and the exile of the intelligensia (2006) Atlantic Books). The exiled philosophers tried to go on with their previous professional lives in cities as Prague, Berlin and Paris. The St. Serge Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris, founded by, among others, Sergei Bulgakov (1871–1944), became the new center of Russian religious (...) philosophy and theology in Europe. Soon, however, the community of immigrant Russian religious philosophers and theologians was divided by conflicting opinions, and fell apart in various brotherhoods and movements. An important conflict was the so-called Sophia controversy: the Brotherhood of St. Photius, which included Vladimir Lossky (1903–1958), as well as the famous spokesman of the Neopatristic Synthesis, Fr. Georges Florovsky (1893–1979), attacked the Brotherhood of St. Sophia, which included the above mentioned Bulgakov. His Sophiology, or study of Sophia, Divine Wisdom, was accused of heresy on the instigation of Florovsky and Lossky. From this Sophia controversy, the Neopatristic Synthesis emerged as the dominant school of Russian Orthodox Theology, whereas Sophiology fell practically into oblivion. This article will attempt to answer the question whether there is still room for a re-valuation of the sophiological stance in Orthodox theology through a survey of recent literature on the subject. The article will conclude the affirmative: namely, that the controversy is shown to be the result of a conflict between generations and the necessity to empower their Orthodox identity in emigration, rather than the result of intrinsic philosophical or theological differences. (shrink)

This article examines the bases and limits to the right to liberty of expression. Both the extreme libertarian and the orthodox liberal views are rejected. Against them, It is argued that the right to liberty is to be defended both as a prima facie intrinsic moral right derivative from man's autonomy and as a conditional right deriving from man's right to access to intrinsic goods including knowledge, True belief, Self-Development. The rights so derived are not absolute rights, But rights to (...) be limited by concern for justice, Other rights, Morality, Knowledge and true belief, And morality. (shrink)

Mealey proposes two categorical classes of sociopath, primary and secondary. I criticize this distinction on the basis that constructs of this kind have proved unrealistic in personality taxonomy and that dimensional systems capture reality much more successfully. I suggest how such a system could work in this particular context.

Not a little speculation has been expended on the Genius in ancient and modern times. I propose very briefly to recapitulate the known facts about him, examine the chief explanations, and give what I consider the true one.

This revised version of Price's 1960 Gifford Lectures in two series at Aberdeen University presents an extensive analysis of the concept of belief and related problems. The author begins by exploring different senses of knowledge. He continues to examine some logical peculiarities of expressions about believing and knowing, of relationships between the two types of expressions, and remarks on the performatory aspects of the relevant expressions. Connections between believing, and the bearing on beliefs of perceptual evidence, self-consciousness, memory and testimony (...) are examined. The results of this examination are applied to introduce systematic distinctions and concepts, which are made constitutive of the concept of belief. The notion of degrees of belief is introduced. The problem of degrees of assent is examined in the context of Newman's criticisms of Locke's view. Specific theories of belief are surveyed, beginning with Hume's theory, and two traditional occurrence analyses of belief are touched upon. The first series is concluded with a brief examination of Descartes' and Hume's views on freedom of assent. The second series examines various dispositional analyses of belief; the notions of believing and "acting as if" are compared, and the connection between inference and assent examined. The notion of half-belief is reviewed, along with Newman's distinction between real and notional assent, and James' self-verifying beliefs. The second series concludes with a discussion of moral beliefs and feelings; belief "in" and belief "that" are compared, and the possibility of a rapprochement between religious belief and empiricist philosophy is examined. While the author offers no full-blown theory of belief--and does not purport to do so--he provides a most informative discussion of the matrix of epistemological and psychological problems called belief, offers new criticisms of both older and present-day views on persisting problems for belief-analysis, and refines these views with new distinctions and concepts.--J. R. H. (shrink)